Although there are multiple holes in elucidating the thinking behind UK’s actions, I will stick to countering one facet of this article — India. This thinking, assumption rather, in the West that a rising India is an asset to counterbalance China’s ambitions is lopsided. There is no clear reason as to why India ‘needs’ to be closer to the US and the UK. You don’t see either of them (or Japan) rushing to side with India on Doklam or the more historical disputes of Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh or the Lama’s residence in India. Vague statements of ‘support’ and ‘strategic vision’ are unhelpful. Take the simple case of access to the country — Indians have a far more laborious process for entering and staying in the UK. Compare and contrast this with Chinese visitors and longer term immigrants. Ditto the US. Just because there is a generational presence of a large diaspora doesn’t make it right. I would even argue there are legitimate reasons for this — the Chinese are wealthier, spend more and bring more to the countries they visit. So these ‘host nations’ might be right to prioritise them. But to take away a ‘low risk’ status from Indian students and talk about UK-India relationships in the same breadth is not palatable, politically, in India. India’s China strategy is misguided and the best thing she can do is to have an independent policy — not one driven by the US. I have written about it here.

Unbridled consumerism in the West has been funded by cheap Chinese imports and record buying of Western debt by China — this will soon stop. Weaker currencies and stagflation might be in the offing in the decade ahead.

With or without US support, and it pains me to say this, India’s military is simply not capable to taking on China’s. India’s only weapon is to prioritise its actions in its sphere of influence — the Indian Ocean. The one area where India has a strategic advantage over China.

Happy to discuss with you where you see India fits into this so-called coalition against China.